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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
GERALD GLEN BELL, ; 
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) REPLY BRIEF 
) Argument Priority 
) Classification No. 2 
) Case No. 870150 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: The traditional discretion of a prosecutor is 
whether and what to charge. Section 78-3a-25(6) allows a prosecutor 
to decide whether to file, what to file and in which court to file 
the charge. Defendant's liberty interest is subject to strict 
scrutiny and the arbitrary and standardless decision of the prose-
cutor of which court to file in is not narrowily tailored to the 
State's compelling interest of providing serious juvenile offenders 
with lengthy supervision and protecting the public from such offen-
ders, nor does 78-3a-25(6) meet the rational basis test. 
POINT II. The issue of whether the Juvenile Court's 
denial of a Motion to Recall is a final appealable order is raised 
for the first time on appeal and should not be considered by the 
court. In the alternative, an order denying recall of a juvenile 
is not a final appealable order inasmuch as the denial of the 
Motion does not terminate jurisdiction, does not finally foreclose 
treatment as a juvenile, does not result after a full investigation 
and hearing, opens the possibility for piecemeal review, does not 
end the litigation or dispose of the case as to all parties on 
the merits and invites delay, expense and burdens upon the court. 
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Even if the order is a final appealable order, the defendant's attack 
of a district court's jurisdiction based on an unconstitutional 
statute was properly brought before the district court and these 
issues are preserved for appeal. 
POINT III. Conditioning the remand of a juvenile to the 
Division of Youth Corrections on the approval of the Division of 
Youth Corrections after Judgment is not a proper delegation of 
legislative power. The legislature has no authority to make indivi-
dual decisions, only to make rules by which individual decisions 
are made. The legislature therefore cannot delegate to the execu-
tive branch the power to determine on a case by case basis whether 
juvenile treatment for an individual is appropriate. It is a 
judicial function to determine the sentence after conviction and is 
a decision which cannot be delegated to the executive branch. Even 
if such delegation were proper, this delegation is not limited by 
sufficient guidelines or standards and does not meet constitutional 
requirements. The issue of defendant's standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of 78-3a-25(8) is raised for the first time on 
appeal and should not be considered by the court. Even if the 
court considers this issue the defendant has standing to challenge 
the constitionality of the direct filing statute on its face by a 
Motion to Dismiss made prior to arraignment, inasmuch as the chal-
lenge went to the jurisdiction of the district court. 
POINT IV. The issues raised by respondent in Point IV. 
were not before the court below and should not be considered for 
the first time on appeal. In the event the court treats these 
issues, the contentions raised in Point IV. by the State are without 
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merit. Because the second amended information charged the defendant 
with attempted second degree homicide during the commission of an 
aggravated robbery, the aggravated robbery charge merged into the 
second degree homicide charge. Even if an attempted commission of 
the aggravated robbery was sufficient for conviction on the second 
degree homicide charge, convicting defendant of both crimes would 
amount to conviction of the defendant on both the inchoate and 
principal offense, which is prohibited by 76-4-302. Because the 
aggravated robbery charge merged into second degree homicide, 
defendant's sentence for aggravated robbery should be vacated. The 
defendant should not be penalized for the State's errors in charging 
the defendant. 
POINT V. The standard suggested by the State in Point V. is 
not a proper standard for amendment of informations after judgment 
and verdict. In any event the defendant was substantially prejudiced 
by proceeding to trial on the felony murder charge instead of the 
intentional murder charge included in the third amended information 
which was filed after judgment, verdict and sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT UTAH'S DIRECT 
FILING STATUTE VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
All references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, 
unless otherwise noted. 
The State argues that treatment as a juvenile is a 
privilege granted by the Legislature and that the Legislature can 
restrict or qualify the privilege as it sees fit, so long as there 
is not involved any arbitrary or discriminatory classification. 
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Whether juvenile treatment is a privilege or a right, laws passed 
by the legislature with respect to treatment as a juvenile may not 
violate constitutional provisions. The State does not deny that 
juveniles within the class are treated differently but attempts to 
justify the unequal treatement of juveniles under §78-3a-25(6) on the 
basis of prosecutorial discretion. 
Whether or not to prosecute and what charge to file or 
bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in 
[the prosecutor's] discretion. 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). A prosecutor's 
traditional discretion is whether and what to charge and has not in 
the past included a choice of the court in which the charge is 
filed. The court in which a charge is filed is controlled by the 
charge and not by an arbitrary decision of a prosecutor. To allow 
the prosecutor to decide whether to file, what charge to file, and 
in which court to file the charges would allow the prosecutor to 
determine prior to a determination of guilt or innocence the possi-
ble punishment and procedural protections available to the juvenile. 
§78-3-25(6) allows one juvenile charged with one of the enumerated 
crimes to receive the protections of the juvenile system while a 
second juvenile charged with the same crime is prosecuted in the 
adult system. The juvenile proceeded against in juvenile court 
would be subject to the juvenile court's supervision until the age 
of 21 , whereas the juvenile who is prosecuted as an adult may be 
imprisoned for life. The difference in procedures and possible 
punishments between the juvenile charged in adult court and the 
juvenile charged in juvenile court is supposedly permissable because 
of an arbitrary and standardless decision by the prosecutor as to 
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what procedures and punishments the juvenile faces. Prosecutorial 
discretion cannot salvage Utah's Direct Filing Statute. 
The discretion of the prosecutor would not be limited by 
a holding that §78-3a-25(6) is unconstitutional. §78-3a-22 reads 
in relevent part: 
(1) Proceedings in childrens1 cases are commenced 
by petition. 
(2) When ever the court is informed by a peace officer 
or any other person that a child is or appears to be 
within the court's jurisdiction, the probation depart-
ment shall make a preliminary inquiry to determine 
whether the interests of the public or of the child 
require that further action be taken. On the basis 
of the preliminary inquiry the court may authorize 
filing of or request that the county attorney file a 
petition . . . 
The county attorney under sub-section (6) of §78-3a-25 is allowed 
to file an information against a juvenile in district court only 
when a petition in the case of a person 16 years of age or older 
alleges one of the offenses enumerated in that section. If after 
the preliminary inquiry made pursuant to §78-3a-22(2), the juvenile 
court determines that further action be taken, the statute allows 
the county attorney to file a petition in the juvenile court. When 
this petition is filed, the county attorney exercises his discre-
tion of whether and what to charge. At this point the traditional 
discretion of the county attorney has been exercised. Ttie county 
attorney's discretion should not be expanded to allow him also to 
decide in which court to file. This in essence allows the county 
attorney to decide the procedural protections and possible punish-
ment of the individual. Prosecutor's have traditionally been able 
to determine the punishment to which an accused would be subject to 
by choosing the charge filed against the accused. This discretion 
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of the proseutor should be exercised in the same manner for juveniles, 
and in fact is exercised when the county attorney selects the 
charge to be included in the juvenile court petition. If the 
county attorney desires to prosecute a juvenile as an adult equal 
protection requires that the initial charge determine the court in 
which the juvenile will be prosecuted. The charge contained in the 
petition should govern the court in which the juvenile is prosecuted, 
not a second arbitrary and standardless decision of a prosecutor. 
Whether or not the above actually transpired in this case is not 
relevant to the Court's determination of whether or not the Utah 
Direct Filing Statute is unconstitutional. 
It is not what has been done but what can be done 
under a statute that determines its constitutionality. 
State v. Jarmillo, 83 New Mexico 800, 498 P.2d 687, 689 (1972). 
The State also contends that physical liberty should not 
be held to be a fundamental right invoking strict scrutiny because 
if so every criminal statute would be entitled to strict scrutiny 
where ever it was challenged on equal protection grounds. This 
assertion is not well-founded. People v. Olivas, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 
551 P.2d 375, (1976), and Matter of CH, 683 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1984), 
applied strict scrutiny to cases where the length of incarceration 
of the accused was in question. A similar holding by this Court 
that statutes effecting the length of incarceration of an accused 
are subject to strict scrutiny would not require every criminal 
statute to be reviewed under strict scrutiny whenever it was 
challenged on equal protection grounds. A further distinguishing 
fact in this case is that the challenged statute is a civil and not 
a criminal statute. 
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Langmeyer v. State, 104 Idaho 53, 656 P.2d 114 (1982) and 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), cited by the State to support 
the claim that even fundamental rights are not necessarily subjected 
to strict scrutiny, deal with the right to travel which has been 
declared fundamental. Langmeyer and Sosna accurately stated hold 
that the compelling state interest test is applied to laws impacting 
the right of interstate travel that deter migration and penalize 
the exercise of the right to travel. The Langmeyer Court expressly 
found that it was unlikely that the durational residency requirement 
at issue would deter a potential new resident from migrating and 
that the durational residency requirement did not in a constitu-
tional sense penalize the right to travel. Therefore, strict 
scrutiny was not triggered. Langmeyer, at 117. The level of 
scrutiny was not addressed in the Court's Sosna opinion. 
Contrary to the State's contention, Wells v. Childrens' 
Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, (Utah 1984), did not uphold a 
statute effecting fundamental parental rights under a rational 
basis review. The Wells Court held that: 
The proponent of legislation infringing parental 
rights must show (1) a compelling state interest 
in the result to be achieved and (2) that the means 
adopted are narrowly tailored to achieve the basic 
statutory purpose. 
Wells at 206. Defendant is not aware of any Utah cases holding 
that something less than strict scrutiny applies when the statute 
challenged effects fundamental rights. The Court should hold as 
argued in Appellant's Brief that physical liberty is a fundamental 
right. Laws having an impact on the length of incarceration of an 
individual should be subject to the compelling state interest test. 
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The Court in the alternative should at least hold that an inter-
mediate standard applies in this instance. 
Defendant's concession that the State has a compelling 
interest in treating juveniles over the age of 16 charged with the 
offenses enumerated in §78-3a-25(6) is not fatal to defendant's 
equal protection attack. Defendant does not attack the statutory 
classification contained in 78-3a-25(6). It is the unequal treat-
ment of members in a class created by the legislature that defendant 
attacks. If all juveniles charged in a juvenile court petition 
with the offenses enumerated in §78-3a-25(6) were filed against in 
district court, defendant would have no cause to attack the con-
stitutionality of this statute. Defendant's objections arise 
because the 78-3a-25(6) allows differential treatment of juveniles 
within the class created by §78-3a-25(6). 
The reasons advanced by the State for the Direct Filing 
Statute are that juveniles who have committed the serious crimes 
enumerated in 78-3a-25(6) will require lengthy supervision, and are 
a threat to public safety. However, the State advances no reason 
for allowing juveniles charged with the enumerated offenses to be 
dealt with differently. A statutory scheme such as 78-3a-25(6), 
which allows some individuals charged in a juvenile court petition 
with the enumerated offenses to remain in the juvenile system and 
face certification while others have an information filed against 
them directly in the district court is not narrowly tailored to 
achieve the basis statutory purpose of providing those individuals 
with lengthy supervision in the adult system beyond the age of 21 
when the juvenile system loses jurisdiction. Such a statutory 
-8-
framework cannot be upheld on the basis of prosecutorial discretion. 
Placing such discretion in the hands of the prosecutor in effect 
amounts to a delegation of legislative authority without standards 
and procedural safeguards which cannot be upheld. White River 
Shale Oil v. Public Service Commission, 700 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Utah 
1985). Tested under the compelling state interest test, the means 
adopted in 78-3a-25(6) are not narrowly tailored to achLeve the 
basic statutory purpose. 
The defendant by failing to dispute for the purposes of a 
compelling state interest test that the State has a compelling 
interest in dealing with juveniles over the age of 16 who are 
charged with the offenses enumerated in §78-3a-25(6) did not intend 
and has not waived his right to challenge that the direct filing 
statute is unconstitutional if reviewed by the rational basis test. 
The State has not set forth a rational basis for the scheme which 
allows discrimination within the class created by the statute. 
Defendant so argued in Appellant's Brief at pages 20, 21 and 22. 
Contrary to the State's contentions, §78-3a-25(6) does 
allow juveniles to be treated in radically different manners. A 
determination made at a recall hearing provided by §78-3a-25(9) 
does not even closely approach the certification hearing provided 
by §78-3a-25 sub-sections (1) through (5). Section 78-3a-25(9) with 
its constitutional infirmaties is not a proper check on the discre-
tion granted to the prosecutor under the statute. This is especially 
so in instances such as this where the defendant's Motion for Recall 
was denied. The risk of prosecution of a juvenile in adult court 
where the juvenile could be more appropriately dealt with in the 
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juvenile system is great here where the Recall Statute provides no 
finding or determination to be made by the Juvenile Court when the 
juvenile is brought before it at the recall hearing. An uncon-
stitutional "safety valve11 is no protection to the juvenile. 
§78-3a-25(6) violates the equal protection clauses of the United 
States and Utah State Constitutions. 
POINT II. AN ORDER DENYING RECALL IS NOT A FINAL 
APPEALABLE ORDER AND DEFENDANT'S DUE 
PROCESS ARGUMENTS ARE PROPERLY BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
The State contends that because the Juvenile Court's 
Order denying the defendant 's motion to recall was not appealed by 
defendant that defendant is precluded from asserting his due process 
argument on appeal. The State does not attack the Court's jurdiction 
in this appeal, it merely contends that the Order denying recall 
was a final appealable Order and that a direct appeal should have 
been taken from the Juvenile Court and that the defendant is circum-
venting the regular appellate process by using a Motion to Dismiss 
in the Trial Court as a basis for the Court's review of defendant's 
due process arguments. The State's challenge is more accurately 
couched as a challenge as to whether or not the defendant's due 
process arguments are preserved for appeal. This contention was 
not before the District Court below. The Court therefore should 
not consider these arguments of the State which are raised for the 
first time on appeal. Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 
(Utah 1983); Pettingille v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185, 
186 (1954); State v. Loe, 732 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Chancelor, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 1985); Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 
P.2d 787, 788, 789, (Utah 1986); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 
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(Utah 1981); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 76 P.2d 372, 374 (Utah 1983). 
Without waiving defendant's objection to raising Point II 
of Respondent's Brief for the first time on appeal, defendant 
treats the issue raised in Point II of Respondent's Brief below* 
The State contends that a motion denying recall is a 
final order from which an appeal may be taken. In support of its 
contention the State refers to an Order of the Utah Court of Appeals 
entered in State in Interest of Byrd, Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 
880108-CA wherein the Court of Appeals determined that an order on 
motion to recall is a final appealable order for the reasons set 
forth in State In Re Atcheson, 575 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978). In 
Atcheson, the Court held that a certification order is a final 
appealable order. The Court relied heavily on the fact that juris-
diction was specifically terminated upon granting the State's 
motion to certify a juvenile to adult court and that the transfer 
of jurisdiction was irrevocable. The Court also relied upon the 
fact that various legislative and judicial protections were effec-
tively and finally foreclosed by the certification order and that 
a full investigation and hearing is held in a certification proceed-
ing. Atcheson at 182, 183. The Utah Court of Appeals' determination 
while persuasive is not binding upon this Court. For the reasons 
to be stated below the Court should reverse the Decision of the 
Court of Appeals and hold that an order on motion to recall juris-
diction is not a final appealable order. 
The factors which the Court relied on in holding a certi-
fication order a final appealable order are not present in this 
instance. Jurisdiction in the juvenile court is terminated prior 
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to holding the recall hearing by the county attorney filing an 
information in the district court. At the time the recall hearing 
is held, jurisdiction over the defendant lies in the district 
court and not the juvenile court. The recall hearing is not a full 
investigation and hearing, rather, it is a cursory determination 
wherein the age of the defendant, the seriousness of offense, and 
the record of the defendant are taken into consideration. In 
addition, the legislative protections that have been developed for 
the juvenile are not effectively and finally foreclosed by an order 
denying recall. §78-3a-25(8) if found constitutional allows the 
district court an opportunity to commit a juvenile to the care, 
custody and jurisdiction of the Division of Youth Corrections. The 
reasoning of Atcheson is not applicable to the case at hand. 
The Court has said that: 
Parties to a suit generally are entitled to only 
one appeal as a matter of right . . . an appeal 
can be taken only from the entry of the judgment 
that finally concludes the action. 
All Weather Insulation v. Amiron Development Corp., 702 P.2d 1176, 
1177, 1178 (Utah 1985). A final judgment is one which ends the 
litigation and leaves no claim remaining for resolution. Tippetts 
v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 738 P.2d 635, 635 (Utah 1987). 
A judgment to be final must dispose of the case 
as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the 
subject matter of the litigation on the merits of 
the case . . . A final judgment is a judgment which 
ends the controversy between the parties litigating. 
North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal 
Co., 46 P. 824, 826 (Utah 1896). As can be seen an Order denying 
recall does not finally conclude the action in the district court. 
The issue as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant remains to 
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be litigated. Nor does an Order denying recall dispose of the case 
as to all the parties or finally dispose of the subject matter of 
the litigation on the merits. At the termination of the recall 
hearing the controversy between the State and the defendant remained 
outstanding. At the point when the recall hearing was denied the 
litigation was far from terminated. 
The policy of the laws of the several states and 
of the United States is to prevent unnecessary 
appeals. It is not the policy of the courts to 
review cases by piecemeal. The interest of litigants 
require that cases shall not be prematurely brought 
to the highest court. The errors complained of may 
be corrected in the court in which they originated; 
or the party injured by them might notwithstanding 
the injury have final judgment in his favor. If a 
judgment interlocutory in its nature were the subject 
of appeal, each of the judgments rendered in the case 
could be brought before the appellate court, and 
litigants harassed by useless delay and expense, 
and the courts burdened with unnecesasry labor. 
. . . The reason of the Rule is obvious. A party 
against whom an interlocutory order is made may 
have all his wrongs redressed and his rights 
protected upon a final hearing, and therefore he 
has no ground of complaint. If his rights are not 
protected on a final hearing in the trial court, 
the error can be corrected on appeal from the 
final judgment. 
North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co., at 827. The points brought 
out in the above quoted passage are equally applicable here. Judi-
cial economy necessitates that cases not be reviewed piecemeal. 
This is a real possibility in the context of a recall hearing. In 
the event the motion to recall is denied, the defendant is then 
entitled to appeal the Court's decision. If the Juvenile Court's 
recall order is reversed on appeal and the defendant is remanded to 
juvenile custody, the defendant may then be subjected to a certifi-
cation hearing. 78-3a-25(9). In the event the defendant is certi-
fied to the district court, under Atcheson he may appeal the certi-
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fication order. This would result in unnecessary delay, expense and 
burdens upon the Court that the rule against piecemeal review is 
designed to prevent. 
A holding that the denial of a motion to recall juris-
diction is a final appealable order would allow an appeal from the 
Juvenile Court which has no jurisdiction and puts more emphasis on 
determining the penalty the juvenile will be subjected to than the 
primary purpose of the adjudication of the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant. An order denying recall disposes merely of a threshold 
jurisdictional issue and should be held to be interlocutory in 
nature. 
A holding by the Court that an Order denying a motion 
for recall is a final appealable order is not fatal to defendant's 
due process challenge. The District Court's Ruling on the Motion 
to Dismiss specifically stated that the District Court had no 
appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the Juvenile Court. (R. 
83). The determination made by the District Court on defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, whi h was ordered by the trial judge (R. 88), 
was that the statute upon which the District Court had taken juris-
diction was constitutional. Defendant's challenge below goes to 
the District Court's jurisdiction based on the constitutionality of 
78-3a-25(6), (8) and (9). The Court's ruling on defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss reserved the issue of the constitutionality of §78-3a-
25(9). Contrary to the contention of the State, defendant may 
attack the constitutionality of the recall of jurisdiction statute 
on its face. 
It is not what has been done but what can be done 
under a statute that determines its constitutionality. 
-14-
State v. Jarmillo, 83 New Mexico 800, 498 P.2d 687, 687 (1972). 
The defendant's due process arguments are properly 
before the Court and the Court should determine them. Section 
78-3a-25(9), as well as the sentencing provisions of §78-3a-25(8) 
act as checks on 78-3a-25(6) and are such integral parts of the 
Direct Filing Statute that consideration of the constitutionality 
of the Direct Filing Statute cannot properly be considered while 
excluding consideration of the recall and sentencing provisions. 
POINT III. SECTION 78-3a-25(8) IS NOT A PROPER 
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER AND 
DEFENDANT HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE 
ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY. 
The State seeks to uphold §78-3a-25(8) on the grounds 
that requiring approval of the Division of Youth Corrections before 
a juvenile defendant can be committed to the Division of Youth 
Correction's custody is a proper delegation of legislative power. 
The State also claims that the defendant has no standing to challenge 
78-3a-25(8)?s constitutionality. These issues are raised for the 
first time in Respondent's Brief and should not be considered by 
the Court. Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983); 
Pettlngille v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185, 186 (1954); 
State v. Loe, 732 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987); State v. Chancelor, 
704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 1985); Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 787, 788, 
789, (Utah 1986); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah 1981); Rosen-
lof v. Sullivan, 76 P.2d 372, 374 (Utah 1983). 
Without waiving defendant's objection to the Court's 
consideration of the State's arguments raised in Point III for the 
first time on appeal, defendant addresses the issues below: 
The State claims that 78-3a-25(8) does not violate Utah's 
-15-
Separation of Powers clause because it is within the power of the 
legislature to determine the appropriate sentencing alternatives 
that will be available to Judges and the legislature has delegated 
to the Division of Youth Corrections the power to determine the 
appropriate placement of juveniles in the interest of the juvenile 
and the public. Respondent's Brief, page 9. While defendant 
agrees that it is within the power of the legislature to determine 
the appropriate sentencing alternatives that will be available to 
Judges, it is a judicial function to decide a defendant's punishment 
after conviction among the alternatives given by the legislature. 
State v. Jones, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (Ariz. App. 1984). The legis-
lature has the power to make, amend or repeal laws, the executive 
department enforces laws, and the judiciary interprets and applies 
the law in actual controversies. Vansickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 
426, P.2d 223, 235, (1976). The legislature has the power to make 
the law, but the judiciary has the power to interpret and apply the 
law in actual controversies. The legislature therefore has no 
power to determine the appropriate placement of juveniles on an 
individual basis. The legislature therefore not having the power 
to make individual decisions regarding an accused's sentence cannot 
delegate that judicial function to the Division of Youth Corrections. 
The legislature in essence has delegated the authority to determine 
the punishment of an individual to the executive branch of govern-
ment. This is clearly a judicial function and inpermissable under 
the separation of powers doctrine. It is the Division of Youth 
Corrections' Duty to execute a juvenile's sentence, not determine 
it. 
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[W]hen the decision to prosecute has been made, 
the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is 
fundamentally judicial in nature, or, to state it another 
way, when the jurisdiction of a court has been properly 
invoked by the filing of a criminal charge, the disposi-
tion of that charge becomes a judicial responsibility. 
. . . [T]he decision to mitigate a sentence properly 
belongs to the Judge . . . 
State v. Jones, supra. 
While it is within the power of the legislature to deter-
mine the appropriate sentencing alternatives available to Judges, 
and the legislature can remove all discretion from a Judge in the 
imposition of a sentence, the legislature cannot take that discre-
tion away from the Court and give it to another branch of government. 
A holding that conditioning a remand of the convicted juvenile to 
the Division of Youth Corrections on the approval of the Division 
of Youth Corrections does not violate the Constitution, is tanta-
mount to telling the legislature that it may condition all of the 
court's sentences of convicted defendants on the approval of adult 
probation and parole. While it would be prudent for the Division 
of Youth Corrections to evaluate a juvenile defendant prior to 
sentencing and provide the court with its opinion as to whether 
treatment in the juvenile system is appropriate, once a sentencing 
alternative is given to the court it may not be unconstitutionally 
conditioned. 
Even if as the State suggests, the legislature could 
properly delegate to the executive branch the discretion to choose 
the appropriate placement of juveniles on an individual basis, the 
delegation contained in 78-3a-25(8) is not a proper delegation 
supported by sufficient standards and procedural safeguards. In 
order for a legislative delegation to survive constitutional scru-
-17-
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209. See also Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. State Department of 
Revenue, 105 Wash. 2nd 318, 715 P.2d 123, 128 (1986). (If the 
issue of standing is not submitted to the trial court, it may not 
be considered on appeal) ; Torrez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 130 Ariz. 223, 635 P.2d 511, 513, Footnote 2 
(Ariz. App. 1981) (Standing may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal). 
In any event the defendant has standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of 78-3a-25(8) inasmuch as defendant's motion to 
dismiss, wherein the constitutionality of this statute and the 
District Court's jurisdiction was challenged was made prior to 
arraignment after the trial court ordered counsel to do so. (R. 
88). The issue is properly reserved for appeal. A challenge of 
the entire direct filing system on its face prior to arraignment is 
an appropriate method to attack the constitutionality of the direct 
filing statute and the jurisdiction of the District Court, inasmuch 
as 78-3a-25(6) is tempered by both subsections 8 and 9. These 
sections are so inter-related that the court should consider the 
constitutionality of the entire statute. The court should also 
grant standing to the defendant because the issues involved in the 
constitutionality of 78-3a-25(6), (8), and (9) are of great public 
importance and ought to be judicially resolved. See Olson v. Salt 
Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 962, (Utah 1986) (Footnote 
1). 
POINT IV. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY IS AN INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE HOMI-
CIDE AND THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY COUNT OF 
THE INFORMATION MERGED INTO THE ATTEMPTED 
SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE CHARGE. 
-19-
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cause the death of another person. (R. 32, 33). The court in order 
to convict the defendant of attempted second degree homicide under 
the second amended information was required to find a completed 
aggravated robbery as charged in Count I of the second amended 
information. 76-5-203(1)(d) states: 
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second 
degree if the actor; . . . 
(d). While in the commission, attempted com-
mission or immediate flight from the commission or 
attempted commission of aggravated robbery . . . causes 
the death of another person. . 
While theoretically under this section a completed aggra-
vated robbery would not be required for conviction of felony murder 
in the second degree, the State chose to charge defendant with 
attempting to cause the death of another person while in the com-
mission of an aggravated robbery. As charged, proof of a completed 
aggravated robbery was required to convict defendant of attempted 
second degree homicide. 
Even if the court finds that a completed aggravated 
robbery was not necessary in order to find the defendant guilty 
of attempted second degree homicide, the completed aggravated 
robbery of which defendant was convicted would still merge into 
the crime of attempted second degree homicide as charged by the 
State below. Utah Code Annotated, 76-4-302 states: 
No person shall be convicted of both an inchoate and 
principal offense or of both attempt to commit an offense 
and a conspiracy to commit the same offense. 
76-4-302 prohibits defendant in this action from being convicted 
of both attempted second degree homicide based on the predicate 
offense of attempted aggravated robbery and the offense of aggra-
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a r r ' -•' ° ^ v o u . d an.", u : «.nvi f - « * - . 
d e f e n d a n t . t ^ t l a t t e m p t e d a g ^ r a v * p *
 :. . u -
r o b b e r y ' * ! f ' • ' . . , . v l i a ^ i i u s ~oi v.vH *n^ -i 
-
 i
 , ^ ^ a i e diiu p r i n c i p a l o f f e n s e a n d wou lu amount 
. o u b i e j e o p a r d } \ : o l a t ) » w - # 
r u e s t a ~ d e f e n d a n t s"-.,'... 
« e r v . «. :v b e n i e n o e t h M . . e g i s l a t i v e l y i ^ " • 
t h e g r e a t s : d e g r e e " •* <-• v u: • - . . _ - . I I J A ^ L - I , 
S t a t e V 10. a f 1 O r * :! .: , ' (- * ' - a t I 
First degree murder basec jredu.;U
 u,icii&e 
ox a^;ravated robbery stands 1;; greater relationship 
to the lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. 
If the greater erin.* id proven then fhp IPCO.V- -i~e 
merges int~ i; . 
1^ * - , ~K, * .r • i aggravaT*H r«*bb*- - .a 
crime of at t err/1 *" ' ^ -!-al ier , r~ 1 -
iciiuatii Lrom being c;nvict^*i a^ < *^-^ \ 
..e predicate offense r>! a ,.:rdVd' * o 
attempted .?ecc"! do* here ! n^ ^ -rdVd.in^ c.rc^s:. iiut 
.<-..*.-.w.. . ioDDci^ * oecaust the d^ravat* J
 r,-o—, -- r. • 
second degree homicide. defend'iV* ^: .J.LLL. r. eLj* 
should he \\u r * . i^^. i.u* '•>< penalized for _:.u 
Sf i! i«"fi erruis i. charging the defendant 
POINT .--.-NDING THE INFORMAllUN AFTER VERUILI ^  
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE VIOLATED DUE 
PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND 
CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM: 
I t S t a t e - r • , « • " • - ^ - : ii i+- nmendru ~t 
11
 * . c u i n g d o u b l e j t ^ p a r e - r o c ^ s s 
- i-. * iK I * -L. : 1 - . _n. dliiCndliieii t S LU 1 r 
• 2 2 -
erdict as long as the defendant's substantial rights are not 
prejudiced and no new offense is charged. This is the same standard 
underwhich pre-verdict amendments are allowed under 77-35-4(d). If 
the legislature had intended that amendments to informations after 
verdict would be allowed if the substantial rights of the defendant 
were not prejudiced and no additional or different offense is 
charged the legislature would have so stated in Section 77-35-4(d). 
However, the legislature specifically mandated that after verdict 
an information may be amended so as to state the offense with such 
particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense upon the same set of facts. 
The cases cited by the State in support of the standard 
suggested by the State for post verdict amendments to informations 
do not support adoption of the suggested standard. In People v. 
Johnson, 644 P. 2d 34 (Colo. App. 1981) the defendant moved for 
dismissal of the charge at the close of the People fs case, on the 
basis that the information did not properly charge the offense. 
The prosecution then moved to amend the information, which Motion 
was granted over defendant's objection. Id. at 37. The facts of 
Johnson nowhere specifically state that the information was amended 
after judgment, sentence and verdict as in the instant case. The 
Johnson court states: 
When amendment of an information is sought after 
trial, as in this case, it may only be permitted if it 
is one of form which does not prejudice any substantial 
rights of the defendant. 
In support of this statement the court cites Collins v. People, 
69 Colo. 353, 195 P 525 (1920). Collins v. People allowed an 
information to be amended upon motion of the State made during the 
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subjected to double jeopardy because of the amended information. 
Defendant has been convicted of attempted felony murder and attempted 
intentional murder. Presently there are two judgments outstanding, 
neither having been vacated. Defendant's substantial rights having 
been prejudiced, the court should hold that amendment of the infor-
mation after judgment and sentence violated double jeopardy, due 
process and defendant's right to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant respectfully requests that the relief 
requested in appellant's brief be granted. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 1988. 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
M. CORT GRIFFIN M 
Attorney for Appellant 
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